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Repudiating the Narrowing Rule
in Capital Sentencing
Scott W. Howe*
This Article proposes a modest reform of Eighth Amendment law
governing capital sentencing to spur major reform in the understanding
of the function of the doctrine. The Article urges the Supreme Court to
renounce a largely empty mandate known as the “narrowing” rule and
the rhetoric of equality that has accompanied it. By doing so, the Court
could speak more truthfully about the important but more limited
function that its capital-sentencing doctrine actually pursues, which is to
ensure that no person receives the death penalty who does not deserve it.
The Court could also speak more candidly than it has since Furman v.
Georgia about the problem of inequality that has continued to pervade
capital selection. If the Court remains unwilling to strike down unequal
death-penalty systems, it should acknowledge the inequality and explain
that the problem addressed by the Eighth Amendment is not
inconsistency but retributive excess.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has declared that the Eighth Amendment
imposes two mandates on capital sentencing. First, a death-penalty
scheme must “rationally narrow the class of death-eligible
defendants . . . .”1 Second, it must “at the sentencing phase allow[] for
the consideration of mitigating circumstances and the exercise of
discretion.”2 The body of doctrine that reflects these mandates stems
from the 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia,3 in which the Court struck

 Frank L. Williams Professor of Criminal Law, Chapman University School of Law. I
thank my colleagues at Chapman University School of Law, particularly Celeste McConville,
Richard Redding, and Dean Tom Campbell. Most importantly, I thank Jetty Maria Howe for
assistance at all stages of the project.
1. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173–74 (2006).
2. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988); see also Marsh, 548 U.S. at 174 (stating
that a capital punishment scheme must “permit a jury to render a reasoned, individualized sentencing
determination based on a death-eligible defendant’s record, personal characteristics, and the
circumstances of his crime”).
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
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down capital sentencing as it then existed, and the quintet of 1976 cases,
in which the Court upheld three new death-penalty schemes and struck
down two others.4
Among students of capital-sentencing law, both opponents and
proponents of the death penalty generally view the doctrine as grievously
flawed.5 Opponents frequently argue that the doctrine is “unresponsive to
the central animating concerns that inspired the Court to embark on its
regulatory regime in the first place,”6 which was the “arbitrary and
discriminatory imposition of death . . . .”7 Proponents emphasize that the
doctrine unduly interferes, for no apparent purpose, with states’ decisions
about how to structure death-penalty trials.8 Commentators from both
camps generally agree that the law embodies a confusing and debilitating
tension between “consistency,” which is the purported goal of the first
mandate, and “individualized consideration,” which is the asserted goal
of the second one.9

4. The decision in all five cases was issued on July 2, 1976. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976) (striking down a statute that mandated the death penalty for first-degree murderers);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (striking down a statute that mandate the death
penalty for first-degree murderers); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding against a facial
challenge a statute that restricted the definition of capital murder and, at a sentencing hearing,
required the jury to answer three special questions affirmatively before a death sentence could be
imposed); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding against a facial challenge a statute
requiring a judge, after a jury recommendation, to find at least one statutory aggravating factor and
to weigh aggravating factors against mitigating factors before deciding to impose a death sentence
on a convicted murderer); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding against a facial
challenge a statute that required a jury or judge to find at least one statutory aggravating factor and to
consider aggravating and mitigating evidence before imposing a death sentence).
5. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 288 (2002); Carol
S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 357–59 (1995).
6. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 359.
7. Id. at 358.
8. See BANNER, supra note 5, at 288 (“Critics on the right complained that the Court’s
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence forced state governments to spend time and money for no good
purpose.”); see also Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 29 (1995) (“The established application of the Eighth Amendment to the
administration of the death penalty will continue to give opponents a legitimate platform from which
to impede even the most determined efforts to carry out the death penalty on a routine basis.”). There
also can be no doubt that developing and enforcing the doctrine has required an enormous
investment of time and resources by the federal courts. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, A Capital
Waste of Time? Examining the Supreme Court’s “Culture of Death,” 34 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 861
(2008).
9. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 5, at 287 (noting “the Court’s constant effort to reconcile
two irreconcilable goals”); NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 137 (2011) (asserting that
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This Article urges a reform to resolve claims that capital-sentencing
doctrine is simultaneously meaningless, overly complex, and at war with
itself. The proposal will satisfy neither committed opponents nor ardent
proponents of capital punishment, because it would preserve the most
important part of existing doctrine and thus, neither assure equality in the
distribution of death sentences nor avoid interference with state decisions
on how to structure death-sentencing deliberations. While the proposal
offers only a modest reform to existing doctrine, it also aims to alter
substantially the existing rhetoric regarding capital sentencing’s central
goal, allowing a more truthful account to blossom. I contend that the
Court should abandon the first mandate, regarding narrowing, and end
the rhetoric about consistency that has accompanied it. At the same time,
the Court should preserve the second mandate, regarding mitigating
evidence and sentencer discretion, and articulate the deeper rationale that
justifies it, which is not simply “individualized consideration,” but a
“deserts limitation”—the notion that no person should receive a death
sentence who does not deserve it.10
I previously have argued that the Court should have avoided
altogether the regulation of capital-sentencing trials under the Eighth
Amendment.11 In Furman or in the 1976 cases, the Court could have
begun to foreclose the use of the death penalty in certain categorical
situations, such as for rape, but otherwise left states to decide how to
structure capital-sentencing decisions.12 Alternatively, the Court could
have held the death penalty impermissible as cruel and unusual
punishment, except perhaps for rare and egregious crimes against the

capital-sentencing law embodies an “obvious tension”); Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The
Supreme Court’s Habeas Reform, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 485, 520–21 (1991) (describing an “inherent
tension” in the Court’s capital sentencing jurisprudence); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 370
(noting “some tension” between the individualization mandate and the consistency aspiration).
Even among the Justices, there is substantial agreement that the two mandates pose a
“tension.” See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 436 (2008) (“The tension . . . has produced
results not altogether satisfactory.”). Justice Blackmun concluded at the end of his career that the
inability to achieve both goals justified judicial abolition. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141,
1147–49 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari). Other Justices have
contended that the tension justifies evisceration of the second mandate, particularly because that
requirement purportedly lacks grounding in the Eighth Amendment. See infra notes 178–79 and
accompanying text.
10. See Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation of the CapitalSentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 797 (1998).
11. See id. at 797–98.
12. See Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 438–43 (2001).
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state or against humanity.13 My contention that the Court should have
avoided regulating capital-sentencing trials stems not from the absence
of an Eighth Amendment rationale for it. Indeed, I believe that the Eighth
Amendment should prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on those
who do not deserve it and that the capital sentencer should follow this
principle in reaching its sentencing verdict.14 The problem for the Court
stems from the inability of the Justices to translate this deserts limitation
into sufficiently specific rules to make Eighth Amendment regulation of
the sentencing trial effective.15 For this very reason, the Court’s capitalsentencing doctrine, even if understood through the prism of the deserts
limitation, has produced benefits of uncertain value.16
Putting aside arguments for deregulation or abolition, however, the
narrowing rule warrants repudiation. First, while the individualization
mandate can be understood as an imperfect effort to protect against
undeserved death sentences, the narrowing rule is too inconsequential to
merit continuance. The narrowing rule as constructed does not coherently
pursue any goal required by the Constitution.17 Second, since the
articulation of the narrowing rule in 1976, the Court has overlapped it
with decisions directly restricting death eligibility. The Court’s decisions
proscribing the death penalty for certain categories of crimes and
offenders has rendered the narrowing rule obsolete.
The third reason to renounce the narrowing requirement is the most
important. Repudiation would help the Court speak more forthrightly
about the purpose of the Eighth Amendment as it applies to capital
13. See Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the
Eighth Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2083 (2004) (explaining the Eighth Amendment argument for abolition based on
disproportionality).
14. See Howe, supra note 10, at 797.
15. See id. at 828–29.
16. See id. at 862; see also LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF
BELIEF 150–51 (1996) (noting the absence of “a good theory about desert and free will” that can lead
to consensus about how to judge the deserved punishment of a murderer).
17. The Court could try to re-explain the narrowing rule as serving the goal of ensuring that
only the deserving receive the death penalty. See Howe, supra note 10, at 833; see also David
McCord, Judging the Effectiveness of the Supreme Court’s Death Penalty Jurisprudence According
to the Court’s Own Goals: Mild Success or Major Disaster? 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 545, 577 (1997)
(noting that while the “winnowing effect” of Georgia’s narrowing effort was “not huge, neither
[was] it de minimis” and that this effect helped to define some undeserving defendants “out of the
death-eligible pool”). While voluntary state narrowing, if significant and well considered, could help
further the deserts limitation, I contend, in Parts II through IV, that the narrowing mandate as
articulated by the Court is so incoherent and, in Part V, that its negative consequences are so
substantial that the Court should renounce it.
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sentencing. The narrowing mandate did not stem from a sensible view
about how the Eighth Amendment could regulate robust death-penalty
systems. It arose from an implausible theory the Court used in 1976 both
to uphold new death-penalty statutes and to assert allegiance to Furman,
a decision in which only three of the Justices were even beginning to
consider Eighth Amendment principles for a regulatory regime.18 In
1976, the Court asserted that Furman had called for “reasonable
consistency” in the use of the death penalty and that some of the new
systems, by providing for protections that included narrowing, achieved
that end.19 In reality, consistency according to offender deserts is
impossible to achieve except through abolition and, in any event, the
narrowing effect that the new statutes provided was too minimal and
haphazard to promote consistency.20 Yet, for decades, the Court has
continued to offer the consistency rationale for the narrowing mandate
with the suggestion that reasonable consistency has been assured.21 This
account has bred confusion over what the Eighth Amendment demands
and deep disillusionment with the Court among many who correctly
recognize that the distribution of death sentences among capital
offenders, while not as egregious as in the pre-Furman era,22 has
remained highly arbitrary and often racially discriminatory.23 This
account also has obscured the truth about inequality for those who are
not predisposed to recognize it.
The Court should stop perpetuating the story that the Eighth
Amendment demands reasonable consistency in the use of the sanction
and that the narrowing rule helps to assure it. The Court has not taken the
consistency goal seriously, and the narrowing rule has served mostly to

18. See infra Part II.
19. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the judgment,
joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.) (contending that the new Georgia statute, by requiring the
finding of an aggravating circumstance as a prerequisite to a death sentence, would help promote
“reasonable consistency”); id. at 196–98 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (noting that the
new Georgia statute “narrow[s] the class of murderers subject to capital punishment” and asserting
that this protection, among others, meant that there should be “non-discriminatory application”).
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 54–91.
22. See, e.g., McCord, supra note 17, at 548 (“In fact, the best available evidence strongly
suggests that post-Furman systems are operating less arbitrarily . . . .”).
23. See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1389 (1988) (asserting that in upholding the Georgia
system in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), in the face of statistics revealing racial bias in
the distribution of death sentences, the majority’s opinion was “grievously flawed,” was comparable
“to Plessy and Korematsu,” “repressed the truth,” and was “detestable”).
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breed confusion and disappointment. As long as the Court continues to
regulate capital trials under the Eighth Amendment, it should declare
forthrightly that the central aim is to prevent undeserved death sentences
and should maintain not the first requirement but the second, regarding
mitigating evidence, which more strongly connects with the deserts
limitation.
My project proceeds in four stages. Part II briefly recounts how the
narrowing requirement began to emerge in the 1976 cases and was
perpetuated in the Court’s subsequent decisions. Part III demonstrates
that the narrowing requirement has been constitutionally inconsequential
as an effort to assure reasonable consistency in the distribution of death
sentences and that the Court cannot effectively reform the requirement to
serve that end. Part IV demonstrates that, since 1976, the grounds for
requiring death-penalty systems to narrow the death-eligible group also
have been overtaken by various Court decisions directly restricting death
eligibility. Finally, Part V explains how repudiation of the narrowing
requirement would assist the Court in accepting and acknowledging the
deserts-limitation theory that actually underlies its decisions restricting
death eligibility and regulating capital-sentencing trials.
II. THE ORIGINS AND PERPETUATION OF THE NARROWING
MANDATE
The narrowing requirement grew out of efforts within the Supreme
Court in 1976 to portray several new death-penalty statutes as congruous
with Furman, and the Court has continued to adhere to that original
version of congruence. A puzzling five-to-four decision in which all nine
Justices wrote separate opinions,24 Furman was generally understood to
strike down, under the Eighth Amendment, the standardless capitalsentencing schemes that then prevailed. However, the decision created
confusion and left the country “in an uncertain limbo” about the future of
the death penalty.25 In 1976, the Court declared Furman a strike against
inequality, although not a blow mandating abolition.26 The narrowing
rule arose because the Court could say that the three new systems that it
upheld in 1976, unlike those that it had invalidated in Furman, narrowed
the class of offenders who were subject to the death penalty, which was

24. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
25. See id. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
26. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
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an attribute that the Court declared in turn to promote consistency.27 The
Justices have perpetuated this consistency account for the narrowing rule
in many subsequent decisions up through the recent past.
A. Furman’s Ambiguity
The Furman decision appeared to be an abrupt about-face from
decisions that the Court had rendered only a year earlier. The ruling
embodied three capital cases, two from Georgia and one from Texas. 28
The inmate from Texas, Elmer Branch, and one of the inmates from
Georgia, Lucious Jackson, had received the death penalty for rape. 29
William Furman had received that sanction in Georgia for murder.30 All
of the defendants were black, and all of the victims were white. 31 The
statutes under which the defendants were sentenced contained no
standards for deciding when to impose death, and no standards were
provided to the sentencers.32 The Georgia defendants were also subjected
to a unitary trial in which the jury heard evidence and deliberated on the
questions of guilt and punishment simultaneously.33 One year earlier, in
McGautha v. California,34 and a companion case, Crampton v. Ohio,35
the Court had rejected arguments that standardless capital sentencing and
unitary trials violated the Constitution.36 However, the Court seemed to
disavow at least some aspect of those decisions in Furman.
The meaning of the Furman decision was unclear.37 In striking down
the death sentences in a one paragraph, per curiam opinion, the majority

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See infra notes 56–67 and accompanying text.
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 238 (1972).
See id. at 239.
See id.
See Carol S. Steiker, Furman v. Georgia, Not an End, But a Beginning, in DEATH
PENALTY STORIES 95, 96 (John H. Blume & Jordan M Steiker eds., 2009).
32. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that, in each case, “the
determination of whether the penalty should be death or a lighter punishment was left by the State to
the discretion of the judge or of the jury”).
33. See Steiker, supra note 31, at 95.
34. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 196–208 (rejecting the argument against standardless capital sentencing); id. at
208–20 (rejecting the argument against unitary capital trials).
37. At one level, the explanation is clear. Two Justices changed their minds. In McGautha,
Stewart and White had been among six Justices, including Harlan, Burger, Blackmun, and Black,
who had rejected the due process challenge. See id. at 184. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall
had dissented. See id. In Furman, Stewart and White changed positions and, along with Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall, supported the per curiam opinion for the Court. See 408 U.S. at 240. The
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said little more than that “the imposition and carrying out of the death
penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”38 The five
concurring opinions, none of which received the endorsement of another
Justice, failed to illuminate an underlying, controlling principle. Justices
Brennan and Marshall each concluded that the death penalty was per se
cruel and unusual.39 The other three concurring Justices asserted that the
Georgia and Texas death-penalty systems violated the Eighth
Amendment in operation. Justice Douglas said the systems allowed for
improper discrimination.40 Justice Stewart said they allowed the death
penalty to be imposed on “a capriciously selected random handful” of
persons who committed capital crimes41 and thus produced punishment
that was “cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual.”42 Justice White said the systems allowed
the death penalty to be “exacted with great infrequency” and provided
“no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is
imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”43 Without specifying
what kind of reforms, if any, could suffice, these three opinions left open
the possibility that new death-penalty statutes might pass constitutional
muster. Considering the five concurring opinions together, Furman
seemed to prohibit discriminatory, arbitrary, or discretionary systems.
Anxiety over racial bias seemed to play a large role in the decision.44
Although some observers, and perhaps a majority of the Justices,
thought Furman would cause most death-penalty states to abandon

dissenters were Burger, Blackmun, Powell (who had replaced Black), and Rehnquist (who had
replaced Harlan). See id.
38. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40.
39. See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring).
40. See id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (asserting that “these discretionary statutes . . .
are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of
equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments”).
41. Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 309.
43. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
44. See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 479 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“Furman v. Georgia was decided in an atmosphere suffused with concern about race bias in the
administration of the death penalty . . . .”); BANNER, supra note 5, at 290 (describing race
discrimination as “the silent specter” that had prompted the Court’s condemnation of standardless
sentencing); see also Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution,
85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1795 (1987) (“From its very beginning, the charge of racism in the
administration of the death penalty was often the text and always the subtext of the abolitionist
litigative campaign.”).
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capital punishment, the decision sparked a fierce public backlash and a
frenzy of new legislation.45 Within four years, thirty-five states enacted
revised death-penalty systems.46 Based on the perceived need to avoid
inequality and infrequency in the use of the death sanction, a large
majority of the new statutes simply required the death penalty for
conviction of a capital offense.47 A much smaller group provided for
bifurcated capital trials and sentencing standards.48 The states varied on
whether they applied the death penalty to crimes other than murder and,
with respect to murder, in how narrowly they defined the capital crime. 49
In states that required bifurcated trials, the standards provided for the
sentencing hearing differed but were generally patterned on an American
Law Institute proposal50 from the early 1960s,51 although the Court had
criticized that approach in McGautha.52 These varied responses
underscored the uncertainty over the meaning of Furman. At the same
time, the totality of new legislation demonstrated that, if popular support
for the death penalty had waned by 1972, Furman itself had sparked a
resurgence.53
B. The 1976 Cases: Narrowing for Consistency
In the 1976 cases, the narrowing requirement began to emerge as
part of a determination within the Court to uphold new death-penalty
statutes while asserting allegiance to Furman. The manifestation of
overwhelming public support for the death penalty after Furman
undermined any claim that American society had come to view the
sanction as altogether inhumane. Influenced by this demonstration,54 a
45. See Steiker, supra note 31, at 102–07.
46. See John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive
Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 226, 238
tbl.1 (1986).
47. See id. at 227, 252 tbl.3 (indicating that 22 states enacted mandatory-death statutes).
48. See Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1690, 1699–1709 (1974).
49. See Poulos, supra note 46, at 227, 248 tbl.2.
50. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The members of the
American Law Institute recently voted to disavow the provision because of insurmountable obstacles
to ensuring the fair administration of the penalty. See Adam Liptak, Shapers of Death Penalty Give
Up on Their Work, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2010, at A11.
51. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00 (McKinney 1967) (adopting Model Penal Code’s
approach to sentencing hearings).
52. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 206–08 (1971).
53. See Steiker, supra note 31, at 103–04.
54. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
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majority of the Justices in 1976 concluded that the Court should uphold
the death penalty in some circumstances.55 The Court did strike down
two mandatory death systems on grounds, among others, that they
improperly denied a defendant the opportunity to present mitigating
evidence.56 However, the Court upheld three new death systems
requiring bifurcated trials on the theory that they promoted consistency,
which the Court asserted was the mandate of Furman.57
Each of the three systems that the Court approved—from Georgia,
Florida, and Texas—appeared to reduce the group of capital offenders
who were death eligible. Before a court could impose a death sentence in
Georgia and Florida, the capital sentencer had to find at least one
aggravating circumstance from a statutory list; only then could the
sentencer consider all aggravating and mitigating circumstances that
might support a potential death sentence.58 Texas limited the definition
of the capital offense to certain aggravated murders, thus narrowing the
death-eligible group at the guilt-or-innocence proceeding before the
sentencing phase commenced.59
In the 1976 cases, the Court highlighted the narrowing aspect of the
three systems as a feature that promoted consistency. The Court
contended that reducing the death-eligible group to certain highly
culpable offenders would likely cause prosecutors and sentencers to

AMERICAN AGENDA 66–67 (1986) (“Two phenomena appear to have strongly influenced Justices
Stewart and White: the impact of Furman on public opinion and the legislative response to
Furman.”).
55. By 1976, seven Justices were prepared to uphold the death penalty in some
circumstances, which meant that three Justices from the Furman majority were not voting to strike
down all of the new statutes. Justice White, part of the majority in Furman, voted to uphold all of the
statutes before the Court in 1976. Justice Stewart, part of the majority in Furman, voted to uphold
the death penalty in three of those systems. Likewise, Justice Douglas, part of the majority in
Furman, was replaced by Justice Stevens, who voted to uphold the same three statutes as Justice
Stewart in 1976. See Poulos, supra note 46, at 227–35.
56. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304–05 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (plurality opinion).
57. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens,
JJ.); id. at 222 (White, J., concurring); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251–53 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.); id. at 260–61 (White, J., concurring); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
276 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.); id. at 278–79 (White, J., concurring).
58. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165–66 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (discussing
the operation of the new Georgia statute); id. at 222 (White, J., concurring); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at
251–53 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (discussing the operation of the new Florida
statute); id. at 260–61 (White, J., concurring).
59. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271, 276 (1976) (discussing the operation of the new
Texas statute); id. at 278 (White, J., concurring).
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regularly favor the death penalty for those who were deemed to fall
within the death-eligible category.60 If a statute could define a deatheligible class that would cover the most death-deserving offenders, the
narrowing strategy, at least in theory, could also produce substantial
consistency in the use of the death penalty.
This point was most explicit in the opinions in Gregg v. Georgia.61
A plurality of three Justices—Stewart, Powell, and Stevens—wrote that
the narrowing function of the Georgia statute helped to ensure that
sentencing discretion “is controlled by clear and objective standards so as
to produce non-discriminatory application.”62 They asserted that a
finding of a statutory aggravator “channeled” and “circumscribed” the
decision of the sentencing jury63 and thereby helped ensure a
“meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death
penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”64 Justice
White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, concurred
on the importance of the narrowing function. He asserted that, if
application of the death penalty is limited to the worst murders, as it was
“in Georgia by reason of the aggravating-circumstance requirement, it
becomes reasonable to expect that juries—even given discretion not to
impose the death penalty—will impose the death penalty in a substantial
portion of the cases so defined.”65 White also asserted that prosecutors
would almost always pursue the death penalty when they could prove
murder plus an aggravating circumstance.66 Thus, he concluded that
there was “reason to expect” that Georgia’s new system would avoid
“the infirmities which invalidated its previous system under Furman.”67
C. Narrowing for Consistency After 1976
Since 1976, the Court has continued to tout the narrowing rule as the
central antidote to the infirmities that justified the Furman decision. In

60. See, e.g., Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring) (asserting, regarding the new
Florida statute, that there was “good reason to anticipate, then, that as to certain categories of
murderers, the penalty will not be imposed freakishly or rarely but will be imposed with regularity”).
61. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.
62. Id. at 197–98 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (quoting Coley v. State, 204
S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974)).
63. See, e.g., id. at 206–07.
64. Id. at 198 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
65. Id. at 222 (White, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 225.
67. Id. at 222.
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two subsequent decisions, the Court rejected state-court applications of
particular statutory aggravators as unduly vague and, thus, inadequate to
narrow the death-eligible group. While the Court has not further applied
the narrowing rule to reject a state-court judgment supporting a death
sentence, it has frequently reiterated that the rule ensures the consistency
required by Furman.
The Court rejected statutory aggravators for inadequate narrowing in
Godfrey v. Georgia68 and Maynard v. Cartwright.69 In Godfrey, the
Court focused on a Georgia statutory aggravator that asked whether the
offense “was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that
it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the
victim.”70 In Cartwright, an Oklahoma aggravator at issue asked whether
the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”71 In neither
case had the state courts applied a narrowing construction of the
aggravator.72
The Supreme Court rejected the application of the Georgia provision
on grounds that a “person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize
almost every murder” to satisfy it.73 The Court rejected the application of
the Oklahoma provision on the same basis, noting that it left the jury
“with the kind of open-ended discretion which was held invalid” in
Furman.74 In both cases, the Court emphasized that narrowing was
essential to help ensure a principled basis for distinguishing the few
cases “in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in
which it was not.”75
In several later cases, the Court upheld state-court constructions of
aggravating circumstances that were similar to those in Godfrey and
Cartwright, but it continued to stress the importance of the narrowing
rule.76 For example, in Walton v. Arizona77 and Lewis v. Jeffers,78 the

68. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
69. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
70. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 422 (plurality opinion) (quoting GA. CODE § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978)
(recodified as GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (2012)).
71. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 359 (quoting OKLA. STAT., tit. 21, § 701.12(4) (1981).
72. See id. at 360–61; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 430–32 (plurality opinion).
73. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428–29.
74. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 361–62.
75. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433 (plurality opinion); Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 363 (quoting
Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433 (plurality opinion)).
76. In Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994), the Court rejected claims that aggravating
factors specified in the California statute for consideration at a final selection stage of the sentencing
process, rather than at the earlier stage for determining death-eligibility, were too vague.
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Court upheld applications of an Arizona statutory aggravator that asked
whether the murder was “committed ‘in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner.’”79 Likewise, in Arave v. Creech,80 the Court upheld
the application of an Idaho statute that asked whether “[by] the murder,
or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited
utter disregard for human life.”81 In all three cases, the Court found that
the state courts had provided a narrowing construction sufficient to pass
constitutional muster.82 The Court also emphasized that the narrowing
requirement plays “a significant role in channeling the sentencer’s
discretion”83 and in providing “a principled basis” for distinguishing
“those who deserve capital punishment from those who do not.”84 The
function of the narrowing requirement, according to the Court, was “to
ensure that the death penalty will be imposed in a consistent, rational
manner.”85
Throughout the modern era, the Court has perpetuated the view that
the Eighth Amendment demands reasonable consistency in the use of
capital punishment and that the narrowing rule helps to assure that
consistency.86 At times, the Court has said something less—that the
Eighth Amendment demands merely that use of the penalty not be

77. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
78. 497 U.S. 764 (1990).
79. Walton, 497 U.S. at 645 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6) (1989)); Jeffers,
497 U.S. at 766 (quoting the same statute).
80. 507 U.S. 463 (1993).
81. Id. at 465 (alteration in original) (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(g)(6) (1987))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
82. See Creech, 507 U.S. at 471–75, Walton, 497 U.S. at 654–55; Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 778–
80.
83. Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 774.
84. Creech, 507 U.S. at 474; see also Walton, 497 U.S. at 655 (rejecting Walton’s claim that
aggravator was “applied in an arbitrary manner and, as applied, does not distinguish his case from
cases in which the death sentence has not been imposed”).
85. Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 776 (quoting Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 960 (1983) (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment)).
86. The Court has asserted an Eighth Amendment goal of consistency or non-arbitrariness in
capital sentencing on various occasions in addition to those already mentioned in this Part. See, e.g.,
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341 (1992) (asserting that “narrowing factors” protect against
“arbitrary and capricious impositions of the death sentence”); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,
541 (1987) (“[D]eath penalty statutes [must] be structured so as to prevent the penalty from being
administered in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion.”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111
(1982) (“Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to provide standards for a constitutional
death penalty that would [promote] . . . measured, consistent application.”).
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“wholly arbitrary”87 or not “wanton” or “freakish.”88 However, the Court
frequently has asserted that the goal is something approaching equality
and that the narrowing rule is the central means for achieving it.89 Only
recently, in Kennedy v. Louisiana,90 the Court reiterated that the function
of the narrowing rule is to “ensure consistency in determining who
receives a death sentence.”91
III. THE INADEQUACY OF THE NARROWING MANDATE TO
ACHIEVE REASONABLE CONSISTENCY
Despite the narrowing requirement’s central role in the Court’s effort
to articulate an underlying principle for modern capital-sentencing law,
this rationale for congruence between Furman and the 1976 cases was
always implausible. This Part contends that the Court should not have
claimed that the post-Furman statutes, by narrowing death eligibility,
achieved reasonable consistency in the use of the sanction and that
inconsistency in its use was the problem that underlay Furman. The idea
that the narrowing effect in the new statutes could promote consistency
according to offender deserts was wildly unrealistic. This Part also
demonstrates that the Court has not in the decades after 1976 enforced
the narrowing mandate to require states to limit death eligibility in
meaningful ways. Ultimately, the problem for the Court stems from its
inability to define which category of offenders deserves the death
penalty.
Narrowing of the death-eligible class can never achieve anything
approaching consistency according to offender deserts, except through
abolition.92 Even extreme narrowing cannot produce equality.93 Assume,
87. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 488
U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.)).
88. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1989) (asserting that the death
sentence was not “wantonly and freakishly” imposed (citation omitted)).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 54–91.
90. 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
91. Id. at 436.
92. The Court on one occasion seemed to concede this point. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 318
n.45 (contending that “narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants” could not eliminate racial
inconsistency in the use of the death penalty).
93. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Forward: Evidence, Inference, Rules, and Judgment in
Constitutional Adjudication: The Intriguing Case of Walton v. Arizona, 81 J. CRIM L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 727, 736–37 (1991) (explaining that, assuming one could understand what constitutes
an “arbitrary” decision, although the total number of “arbitrary” death sentences could be reduced by
reducing the number of cases processed as capital ones, the number of “arbitrary” life sentences
could increase).
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for example, that the penalty was reserved only for the assassination of
certain high government officials and for terrorist attacks causing the
death of ten or more persons. Criminals falling within the death-eligible
class would likely receive the death penalty at a high rate, even if the
death penalty remained discretionary with the sentencer, as required by
the prohibition on mandatory death penalties.94 These crimes are
sufficiently egregious that prosecutors and sentencers probably would
favor the death penalty much of the time, regardless of the presence of
other factors that might often influence decisionmakers to favor life
imprisonment. However, extreme narrowing of this sort amounts to near
abolition. These crimes rarely occur. Moreover, even such extreme
narrowing would not produce consistency according to an offender’s
deserts, because many equally death-deserving offenders would commit
horrible crimes not captured by the definition of the death-eligible class,
and some offenders who fell within the definition would still escape the
sanction although they deserved it.95 The capital-selection process is
filled with opportunities and pressures for prosecutors to spare offenders
who deserve the death penalty, and at the guilt-or-innocence and
sentencing stages, judges and juries also retain discretion to grant
merciful reprieves.96 Despite the Court’s repeated rhetoric, narrowing
cannot assure “that the death penalty will be imposed in a consistent,
rational manner”97 nor provide a “meaningful basis for distinguishing the
few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed, from the many in which it is
not.’”98 The only way to assure consistency in the use of the death
penalty is to abolish it.
Although the Court has at times described the goal as simply
“reasonable” consistency,99 the Court also has not demanded that states
narrow in the major way required to achieve even that more modest end.
The Court long ago seemed to give up on any requirement that states
avoid vague aggravators. In Walton v. Arizona100 and Lewis v. Jeffers,101
94. See supra text accompanying note 54.
95. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 93, at 736–37.
96. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 5, at 288 (discussing the many non-desert-based reasons
that most offenders who appear death eligible escape the death sanction).
97. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 776 (1990) (quoting Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 960
(1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
98. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (plurality opinion) (alteration in original)
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.)).
99. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (plurality opinion).
100. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
101. 497 U.S. 764 (1990).
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the Court relied on state court adoptions of purportedly limiting
constructions to approve an Arizona aggravator that asked whether the
murder was “committed ‘in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved
manner.’”102 In Arave v. Creech,103 the Court relied on the same
rationale to uphold an Idaho statute that asked whether “[by] the murder,
or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited
utter disregard for human life.”104 However, the limiting constructions
seemed as vague as the statutory language. The Arizona Supreme Court
had essentially required only that the killing appear “senseless,”105 and
the Idaho Supreme Court had merely required that the killing be “coldblooded” and “pitiless.”106 Constructions of this kind, just like the vague
statutory language, “invite an affirmative answer in every case.”107
The Court also has not otherwise required states to limit the overall
coverage of their death-penalty statutes to the degree necessary to pursue
near-equality according to deserts. For example, after Furman, Georgia
retained the death penalty “for six categories of crime: murder,
kidnapping for ransom or where the victims is harmed, armed robbery,
rape, treason, and aircraft hijacking.”108 Likewise, the aggravators in the
new statute, taken together, covered the vast majority of those capital
crimes.109 The most thorough and sophisticated study of the death
102. Walton, 497 U.S. at 645 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 13-703(F)(6) (1989)); Jeffers,
497 U.S. at 766 (quoting the same statute).
103. 507 U.S. 463 (1993).
104. Id. at 465 (alteration in original) (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(g)(6) (1987))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
105. State v. Gretzler, 659 P.2d 1, 11–12 (Ariz. 1983).
106. State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187, 201 (Idaho 1981).
107. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 374.
108. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 162–63 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.)
(footnotes omitted). In Gregg, the plurality emphasized that the Georgia Supreme Court had, in
Gregg’s case and on several occasions since Furman, rejected the death penalty for armed robbery.
See id. at 205–06.
109. The aggravating circumstances in the post-Furman Georgia statute were as follows:
(1)The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a person
with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of murder was
committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal
convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed while the
offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony or aggravated battery,
or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the
commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery or kidnapping knowingly created a
great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or
device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.
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penalty conducted in any state—by the famous Baldus team—found that
“more than 90 percent of the pre-Furman death sentences [in Georgia]
were imposed in cases whose facts would have made them death-eligible
under Georgia’s post-Furman statute.”110 Thus, any appearance of major
narrowing was illusory.
The Court also has not required that narrowing efforts focus on
identifying the most death-deserving offenders. From a deserts
perspective, aggravating factors that were included on Georgia’s
statutory list made little sense in light of factors that were excluded.
Shooting to death an important civil-rights leader out of racial hatred or
to thwart her work was not a death-eligible offense, while committing a
murder for pecuniary gain would render the offender death-eligible.111
Why should such a horrible crime be excluded if such ordinary murders
were covered? Shooting a small child, a severely handicapped man, or an
elderly woman out of spite was not necessarily included, while killing
during a robbery automatically rendered the offender death eligible.112
Why was the perpetrator who assassinated a helpless person less culpable
than the offender who committed one of the most common of murders?

(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the purpose
of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or solicitor or
former district attorney or solicitor was committed during or because of the exercise of
his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an
agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an
aggravated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections
employee, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the
lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or
another.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1975) (recodified as GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (2012)),
quoted in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 165 n.9 (1976). The statute also allowed that in cases of
treason or aircraft hijacking, none of the statutory aggravating circumstances need be found as a
prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty. See id.
110. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 102 (1990)
[hereinafter BALDUS STUDY].
111. See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1975) (recodified as GA. CODE ANN. § 17-1030(b)(7) (2012)).
112. See id.
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The lack of good answers to these questions underscores that the
statute’s minor narrowing effect was not tied to any reasonable measure
of culpability.113
Various other modern death-penalty systems based on the 1976 cases
also fail to reduce significantly the death-eligible group so as to identify
the most culpable offenders. The Supreme Court “has placed no outer
limit on the number of aggravating factors that a state may adopt.”114 As
a consequence, several states, like Georgia, specify ten or more
aggravating circumstances that individually can support a death sentence
and that together cover the vast majority of all capital offenses.115
California, for example, currently specifies twenty-two categories of
aggravating circumstances, some with multiple parts.116 Professor
Gerald Uelmen has concluded that these special circumstances “can be
applied to 87% of the murders committed in California.”117 Likewise,
the federal death penalty applies to a broad array of offenses, including
several nonhomicide crimes, and the list of aggravating circumstances
that can render an offender death eligible is expansive.118
In Georgia and states with similar systems, as in the pre-Furman era,
many offenders are death eligible, but only a few receive death sentences
and even fewer are executed.119 Most persons who are death eligible are
reprieved by prosecutors and jurors for reasons that have nothing to do
with whether they deserve the death penalty.120 A system so filled with

113. Some of the statutory aggravators were surely grounded in part on utilitarian
considerations, such as the effort to deter future crimes. Yet, jurors may be less likely to sentence an
offender to death on deterrence grounds than on grounds that he is highly culpable, which means that
such aggravators will not tend to produce consistently high death-sentencing rates among the death
eligible. For other reasons as well, I have argued that statutory aggravators defining death eligibility
should describe egregious offender culpability rather than circumstances conforming to the state’s
heightened desire to deter. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 13, at 2141–43.
114. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 374.
115. See id.
116. See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.2 (West 2011).
117. Gerald F. Uelmen, Death Penalty Appeals and Habeas Proceedings: The California
Experience, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 495, 497 (2010) (citing CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (2008), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJ
FinalReport.pdf); see also Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme:
Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1287 (1997) (asserting that California’s death
penalty scheme is “arguably the broadest such scheme in the country”).
118. See generally LINDA E. CARTER, ELLEN S. KREITZBERG & SCOTT W. HOWE,
UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 352–54 (2d ed. 2008).
119. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 375.
120. The Baldus researchers found, for example, that “in 59 percent of the death-eligible
cases, a life sentence was imposed by default when the prosecutor unilaterally waived the penalty
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opportunities for discretionary reprieves—through charging decisions,
plea-bargaining decisions, decisions not to pursue death after a guilty
finding, nullifications by juries and sentencing decisions that remain
essentially standardless121—could not be expected to produce consistent
outcomes.122 Indeed, from 1977 to 1999, Georgia sentenced only 243
persons to death out of 10,912 persons arrested for murder, for a deathsentence-to-murder rate of 2.2 per hundred.123 Given that almost all
murders in Georgia were death-eligible offenses,124 one could not
plausibly claim that narrowing had produced anything approaching
equality according to deserts in the use of the death penalty.125
The Court also cannot remedy the inconsistency problem, except
through abolition or near abolition. We have already seen that even
extreme narrowing will not produce true consistency in the use of the
death sanction.126 However, without effectively shutting down deathpenalty systems, the Court also cannot demand even “reasonable”
consistency. A central problem is that even the worst homicides appear
to fall into an expansive array of various kinds of murder that cannot find
definition in narrow terms.127 Many states have resisted narrow
definitions of death eligibility precisely because restrictive definitions

trial” after a conviction. BALDUS STUDY, supra note 110, at 106. See also JOHN J. DONOHUE III,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONNECTICUT, 1973-2007: A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION FROM 4686
MURDERS TO ONE EXECUTION 2 (2011), available at http://works.bepresscom/john_donohue/87
(“At best, the Connecticut system haphazardly singles out a handful for execution from a substantial
array of horrible murders.”).
121. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1982) (conceding that “the finding of an
aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its
discretion, apart from its [purported] function of narrowing the class of persons convicted of murder
who are eligible for the death penalty”).
122. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 5, at 288 (noting many arbitrary factors that influence the
capital-selection process).
123. See John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Explaining Death Row’s
Population and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 172 (2004).
124. See BALDUS STUDY, supra note 110, at 268 n.31 (noting that approximately eighty-six
percent of people convicted of murder in a five-year period after the passage of the post-Furman
statute were death eligible).
125. If eighty-six percent of the 10,912 murders were death-eligible crimes, the death-sentence
to death-eligibility rate in Georgia for the period would have been one death sentence for every 38.6
death-eligible murders.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 90–95.
127. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971) (“To identify before the fact those
characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to
express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the
sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability.”).
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fail to include many of the most culpable offenders.128 For this same
reason, the Court cannot identify a robust but specific category of deathworthy cases in which the offenders are so culpable that arbitrary factors,
such as the race of the victim or of the defendant, the quality of defense
counsel, or the influence of political or financial pressures on the
prosecutor, would not matter.129
The Court also cannot plausibly pursue consistency by simply
directing states to achieve a certain proportion between death-eligible
offenders and death sentences. We can theorize that the Court could, for
example, order states to narrow to a degree that one of every five or ten
death-eligible offenders receives a death sanction, rather than one of
approximately every forty, which represents the post-Furman situation in
Georgia.130 However, the Court would not know what proportion to
mandate in a particular state to achieve “reasonable” consistency, as
measured, for example, by near-zero-racial-disparity levels. The correct
proportion seemingly would vary over time and across jurisdictions.131
Also, the Court would have no good basis to know whether the
proportion chosen in a particular state was working until many persons
already had received death sentences. The litigation that would arise in
any effort to confront these problems would largely shut down the use of
the death penalty.132 Thus, attempting to force states to narrow is not an
effective regulatory strategy for the Court to try to promote equality in
the use of the death penalty.
IV. HOW PROPORTIONALITY DOCTRINE HAS SUPERSEDED
THE NARROWING MANDATE
The narrowing requirement is also obsolete in light of modern
rulings by the Court that prohibit the use of the death penalty for certain
categories of offenders. Beginning in 1977 and continuing with a series
128. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 416 (noting a serious concern that forced
narrowing would require states to exclude from their definitions of death eligibility many of the
worst offenders).
129. See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1431 (1988) (“The one thing upon which death penalty
deregulators and death penalty abolitionists agree is that ‘the task of selecting in some objective way
those persons who should be condemned to die is one that remains beyond the capacities of the
criminal justice system.’”) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring)).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 121–123.
131. See Howe, supra note 13, at 2131.
132. See id. at 2130–31.
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of important decisions since 2002, the Justices have foreclosed the use of
the death penalty for, among others: rapists of adult victims, kidnappers,
certain felony murderers, retarded offenders, juvenile offenders, and
child rapists.133 These “proportionality” decisions have helped to reduce
racial discrimination in the use of the sanction and in that sense, to
promote consistency.134 However, the decisions do not purport to
prevent inconsistent use of the death penalty but rather, only undeserved,
or disproportionate, death sentences.135 By demonstrating a plausible
Eighth Amendment purpose for the Court to narrow the death-eligible
class, proportionality doctrine underscores the lack of a feasible function
for the narrowing rule.
The groundbreaking proportionality decision after Furman was
Coker v. Georgia,136 in which the Court banned the death penalty for the
rape of an adult victim. Writing for a four-Justice plurality,137 Justice
White sought to demonstrate that society generally had come to oppose
the death penalty for all rapes.138 He contended, in any event, that the
question whether capital punishment was excessive was ultimately for
the Court’s “own judgment.”139 The retributive basis for the plurality’s
judgment was clear. Justice White did not deny that the execution of
rapists as much as the execution of murderers could serve general
deterrence goals. He also did not deny that there were incapacitation
benefits from executing an unusually dangerous offender like Coker,
who had raped the victim while on escape from prison, where he was
serving multiple life sentences for earlier crimes of brutality.140 Instead,
Justice White argued that rape, while awful, was not among the category

133. See infra text accompanying notes 134–154.
134. See infra notes 155–159 and accompanying text.
135. See Pamela A. Wilkins, Rethinking Categorical Prohibitions on Capital Punishment:
How the Current Test Fails Mentally Ill Offenders and What to Do About It, 40 U. MEM. L. REV.
423, 453–56 (2009); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA.
L. REV. 677, 721–25 (2005).
136. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
137. Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed with the judgment on broader grounds, concluding
that the death penalty was altogether unconstitutional. See id. at 600 (Brennan, J., concurring); id.
(Marshall, J., concurring).
138. For the view that the argument was unpersuasive, see Scott W. Howe, Resolving the
Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV.
323, 346 n.89 (1992).
139. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion).
140. Previously, Coker had raped and murdered one woman and, in a separate incident, had
raped and tried to kill another. See id. at 605 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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of horrible crimes for which the death penalty was deserved.141 Thus, the
opinion embraced a deserts limitation on the death penalty that insists
that utilitarian arguments for executions, such as deterrence and
incapacitation, yield to retributive limits.
For twenty-five years after Coker, the Court made only modest use
of the proportionality mandate to announce additional categorical
restrictions on the death penalty. Coker strongly implied that most
ordinary nonhomicide crimes, such as robbery or burglary, were not
punishable with death, and the Court also promptly excluded kidnapping,
where no life was taken.142 In Enmund v. Florida,143 the Court also
exempted certain minor participants in murders from death eligibility.144
Although for a unique sort of excessiveness, the Court also held, in Ford
v. Wainwright,145 that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a
prisoner who is insane. Likewise, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,146 the
Court rejected the death penalty for a fifteen-year-old murderer and
raised serious doubts that it would allow any future executions of persons
who committed a capital crime before age sixteen.147 At the same time,
the Court initially rejected claims that offenders who were retarded or
under age eighteen at the time of their offenses were immune from the

141. See id. at 598 (plurality opinion) (“Rape is without doubt deserving of serious
punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does
not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.”).
142. See Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977), rev’g Eberheart v. State, 206 S.E.2d 12
(Ga. 1974) (holding that a statute imposing the death penalty for kidnapping did not violate the
Eighth Amendment).
143. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
144. The Court later limited the exemption that Enmund had drawn. In Enmund, the Court had
exempted the accomplice in a felony murder who did not himself kill or intend to kill. See id. at 798.
In Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987), the Court ruled that “major participation in the felony
committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life” was enough for the death penalty to
apply.
145. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
146. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
147. Id. at 838. Justice O’Connor provided the fifth vote, and her separate opinion was not
definitive regarding the underlying principle. The objective evidence of a societal consensus was less
impressive than the objective evidence of a societal consensus in Coker and Enmund, because many
states did not set a minimum age on the use of the death penalty although they also had not for many
years imposed a death sentence for an offense committed by a person below age sixteen. See id. at
852–53 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Consequently, Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment only
on grounds that persons who were below the age of sixteen at the time of their offenses could not be
executed “under the authority of a capital punishment statute that specifies no minimum age at
which the commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender’s execution.” Id. at 857–58.
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capital sanction,148 and the Court did not further extend the
proportionality doctrine for the rest of the century.
Beginning in 2002, however, the Court dramatically expanded the
proportionality exemptions. First, in Atkins v. Virginia, mentally retarded
offenders gained protection.149 Three years later, in Roper v. Simmons,
the Court excluded juvenile offenders.150 Likewise, in 2008, in Kennedy
v. Louisiana, the Court exempted offenders convicted of child rape.151 In
these decisions, as in Coker, a deserts limitation explained the outcomes.
The Court found that retarded offenders, juvenile offenders, and child
rapists are insufficiently culpable to warrant the death penalty.152 The
Court also claimed—although not always convincingly—to find
objective evidence that a societal consensus had arisen against the death
penalty for these offenders.153 Likewise, regarding retarded and juvenile
offenders, the Court muddled its analysis by asserting that capital
punishment was less effective in serving deterrence goals.154 But, in
Kennedy, the Court conceded that the death penalty for child rapists
might help deter them, and it still found the death penalty excessive.155
Likewise, in Atkins and Simmons, as Professor Pamela Wilkins has

148. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (upholding the death penalty for
seventeen- and sixteen-year-old murderers); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (upholding
the death penalty for retarded offenders).
149. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
150. 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005).
151. 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008).
152. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 435; Simmons, 543 U.S. at 571; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
153. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 438–40. For an argument that changes after 1989 in societal
views about the death penalty generally, not changes embodied in the Court’s “evolving standards”
analysis, largely account for the Court’s willingness to expand proportionality protections beginning
in 2002, see Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 35–57 (2007).
154. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 571–72; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20. The Court’s discussions
in Atkins and Simmons regarding the reduced deterrent effect of the death penalty were unfortunate.
Whether or not the imposition of the death penalty on retarded and juvenile murderers would help
deter other retarded and juvenile persons from crime, a legislature could still conclude that such
punishment could help deter those who are not retarded or juveniles. Professor H.L.A. Hart pointed
out long ago that, as a theoretical matter, the fact that an offender suffers from a condition that
makes him undeterrable does not mean that there is no deterrent effect in punishing him. H.L.A.
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 19–20, 43 (1968). Indeed, the central explanation for
proportionality doctrine begins with the acknowledgment that imposing the death penalty on persons
who do not deserve it can serve utilitarian ends. Thus, rather than deny the likelihood of deterrence,
the Court would have done better in Atkins and Simmons to clarify that the Eighth Amendment aims
to prevent the use of the death penalty when the offender does not deserve it, although there may be
utilitarian advantages in executing him.
155. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441 (“[I]t cannot be said with any certainty that the death penalty
for child rape serves no deterrent . . . function.”).
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noted, “it seems clear that the Court’s independent conclusion . . . rested
principally upon the deserts determination.”156 The overall effect of
these recent decisions, combined with Coker and its earlier progeny, is to
narrow the possible application of the death penalty away from the most
marginal categories of cases in terms of offender deserts.
While the explanation for the proportionality decisions is avoidance
of retributive excess, the targeted exclusions also have promoted
consistency by reducing racial disparities in the use of the death sanction.
Coker surely had the most dramatic effect. Among the 455 men whom
states executed for rape from 1930 to 1972, 405, or 89%, were AfricanAmerican, and almost every victim was white.157 “Rape had always been
the crime for which the race of the defendant made the biggest
difference, so Coker instantly wiped away more discrimination than any
reform of murder sentencing could have.”158 The prohibition on juvenile
executions may also have helped. In the post-Furman era, twelve of the
twenty juvenile murderers who faced execution were African-American
or Latino, and, in seventeen of those cases, the victim or victims were
white.159 Likewise, in Kennedy, the Court conceded “no confidence” that
use of the death penalty to punish child rape could avoid the problem of
arbitrariness—a concern primarily about race discrimination160—that
confronted the Justices in Furman.161
The proportionality decisions have overtaken the narrowing rule so
as to highlight its superfluity. Imagine, for example, that after Furman
Georgia had enacted a new death-penalty statute that narrowed death
eligibility in the way that the Court’s proportionality decisions have now
narrowed the permissible scope of the death penalty. The statute would
have defined a capital offense to include only murder, excluding several
nonhomicide offenses, such as rape, that the Georgia statute covered at
the time of Furman.162 Likewise, the statute would have required after

156. Wilkins, supra note 135, at 456.
157. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Coker v. Georgia: Of Rape, Race, and Burying the Past, in
DEATH PENALTY STORIES 171, 193 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009).
158. BANNER, supra note 5, at 289.
159. See VICTOR STREIB, NO. 77, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH SENTENCES
AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973–FEBRUARY 28, 2005, at 4 (2005),
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/juvdeathstreib.pdf.
160. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 439.
161. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
162. See e.g., Act of April 11, 1968, No. 1157, Sec. 1, §§ 26-401(e), 26-2001, 26-3102, 1968
Ga. Laws 1249, 1264, 1299, 1335 (repealed and renumbered 1981). The system would also have
provided a process to protect from execution those inmates who are insane on a proposed date of
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conviction that the jury find not a single aggravating factor but all three
of the following: (1) that the offender was not retarded; (2) that the
offender was not under age eighteen at the time of the offense; and (3)
that, if the offender did not actually kill or intend to kill, and was, thus,
only guilty as an accomplice to a felony murder, she exhibited “major
participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless
indifference to human life.”163 In addition, the statute would have
allowed the jury, assuming it found all three factors present, to weigh all
of the additional evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in
reaching a sentencing decision.164 Such a system would have met the
two Eighth Amendment requirements for a constitutional deathsentencing scheme.165 The system would have narrowed the deatheligible group, and it would have allowed for the consideration of
relevant mitigating evidence. Would it have become unconstitutional
because it would today accomplish no more narrowing than the Court
has directly accomplished through its various proportionality cases? The
Court has never pursued the proposition that the narrowing rule requires
a particular kind or amount of narrowing.166 Yet, if no additional
narrowing is required, the narrowing rule today commands nothing more
than proportionality doctrine requires.
The robust development of proportionality doctrine underscores why
the Court should concede that the narrowing rule is superfluous.
Proportionality doctrine demonstrates that the Court can provide specific
direction about the narrowing that states must accomplish to serve a
plausible Eighth Amendment end. By contrast, the narrowing rule has
gone largely undeveloped, because it lacks a plausible Eighth
Amendment function. Proportionality doctrine both reveals the actual
rationale for limited narrowing by the Court and highlights the vacuous
nature of the separate call for states, without specific direction, to
narrow.

execution. See supra text accompanying note 145.
163. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987); see also supra note 142 and accompanying
text (discussing the exclusion for certain accomplices on the fringes of the felony-murder rule).
164. I assume that the system would also have included a requirement that the Georgia
Supreme Court conduct an appellate review to ensure that a death sentence did not appear excessive
in relation to sentences imposed in similar cases. The plurality in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
154 (1976) (plurality opinion), noted that the new Georgia statute included such a mandate. See id. at
198. At the same time, the Supreme Court has clarified that this kind of appellate review is not
necessarily required by the Eighth Amendment. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50–51 (1984).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 1–2.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 97–123.
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V. THE BENEFITS OF REPUDIATING THE NARROWING
MANDATE
While the narrowing mandate has not amounted to much in practice
and lacks a plausible Eighth Amendment explanation, one might still
question why the Court should openly repudiate it at this late date. After
all, the Court has not done much since 1976 to develop and enforce the
requirement and has also effectively retreated from the small steps
forward that it took in Godfrey and Cartwright.167 If the Court already
has essentially abandoned the narrowing mandate, except in rhetoric,
why now repudiate it? The answer is that candor from the Court could
help reduce continuing confusion over the goal of the second mandate in
capital-sentencing doctrine and promote intelligent discourse about how
best to pursue that goal. Likewise, candor could clarify that the Court
does not believe that capital-sentencing doctrine has assured reasonable
consistency in the use of the death penalty. Repudiation of the narrowing
rule would help the Court acknowledge that the Eighth Amendment goal
that it has pursued in regulating capital-sentencing trials is not equality
but the avoidance of undeserved death sentences.
A. Developing a Rationale for Regulating Capital-Sentencing Trials
The idea that the narrowing rule aims to achieve consistency has
long given rise to confusion over how the Court could endorse the
second mandate: individualized sentencing based on expansive
consideration of mitigating evidence and the exercise of discretion.168 If
the first mandate aims to pursue equality, the second seems to honor
something opposite—that every capital offender is unique or nearly so
when it comes to assessing his proper punishment.169 Some Justices have
cited this purported conflict as a reason to abandon the death penalty, and
others have cited it as a reason to confine or even abandon the second
mandate.170 Of course, these arguments ignore not only that narrowing
and individualized sentencing are actually compatible as doctrines,171

167. See supra text accompanying notes 66–73.
168. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital
Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1001 (1996) (“Commentators have often remarked that
Furman’s mandate of consistency and Woodson’s mandate of individualization compete with one
another at some level.”).
169. See CARTER, KREITZBERG & HOWE, supra note 118, at 169.
170. See infra text accompanying notes 178–179.
171. See infra notes 182–183 and accompanying text.
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but also that the Court has never developed the narrowing rule, nor has
the rule itself ever produced consistency. Nonetheless, the Court’s
continued use of consistency rhetoric in explaining the narrowing rule
has fueled the ongoing confusion and impeded the development by the
Court of a plausible Eighth Amendment theory to explain the second
mandate.172 Explicit repudiation of the narrowing rule would help the
Court to acknowledge that the Eighth Amendment regulation of capitalsentencing trials should center on the principle behind the second
mandate.
1. The rhetorical conflict of the two mandates
Within the Court, the idea that the Eighth Amendment doctrine
embodies a problematic tension between the two mandates has come
largely from the conservatives, whose goal is not to promote consistency
but to cabin or eviscerate the second mandate.173 The second mandate
first arose from the two 1976 decisions in which the Court struck down
mandatory death systems in North Carolina and Louisiana.174 A decisive
plurality—Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens—concluded that the
mandatory schemes precluded the sentencer from considering “the
possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the
diverse frailties of humankind.”175 Dissenters claimed that these
decisions were at odds with Furman and the pursuit of consistency that
the same plurality had endorsed in upholding three other statutes in
1976.176 Nonetheless, the Court reiterated and even expanded the
individualized-sentencing requirement two years later in Lockett v. Ohio,

172. See Howe, supra note 12, at 438–40.
173. If conservatives, in pointing to the conflict, actually sought to achieve consistency in the
distribution of death sentences, they would have to view all existing death penalty statutes as
unconstitutional. All existing statutes provide the individualized consideration required by the
second mandate and thus, could not provide consistency, according to the argument. Conservative
Justices have not endorsed the view that all existing death penalty statutes are unconstitutional. See
Scott W. Howe, Furman’s Mythical Mandate, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 435, 459–60 (2007).
174. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976).
175. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion). See also Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333–34
(“Even the other more narrowly drawn categories of first-degree murder in the Louisiana law afford
no meaningful opportunity for consideration of mitigating factors presented by the circumstances of
the particular crime or by the attributes of the individual offender.”).
176. See, e.g., Roberts, 428 U.S. at 346 (White, J., dissenting) (“[W]e are now in no position
to rule that [Louisiana’s] present law, having eliminated the overt discretionary power of juries,
suffers from the same constitutional infirmities which led this Court to invalidate the Georgia death
penalty statute in Furman.”).
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when it rejected an Ohio “special-question” system as too mandatory.177
The Lockett Court ruled that the capital sentencer must remain free to
reject the death penalty based on “any aspect of a defendant’s character
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”178 Conservative
Justices have continued to allege a problematic tension with the goal of
consistency as a reason to confine or even abolish this expansive
individualization rule.179 Justices Scalia and Thomas also have asserted
that the individualization rule lacks an Eighth Amendment
explanation,180 and, indeed, the Lockett opinion did not provide a welldeveloped rationale for it. The Court has continued generally to enforce
the Lockett holding,181 but that mandate also continues to face criticism

177. See 438 U.S. 586, 607 (1978) (plurality opinion). The Ohio statute required a death
sentence unless the offender could establish by a preponderance of the evidence one of three
mitigating circumstances:
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that the
offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender’s psychosis or mental
deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.
Id. at 612–13 (appendix to opinion of the Court) (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West
1975)).
178. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion).
179. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 49 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing his
argument in Walton); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 293–94 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(repeating essence of his argument in Walton); id. at 294–95 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting
petitioner’s claim on grounds that contradiction in the doctrine justified restricting the
individualized-consideration mandate); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 373 (1993) (“Our capital
sentencing jurisprudence seeks to reconcile two competing, and valid, principles in Furman, which
are to allow mitigating evidence to be considered and to guide the discretion of the sentencer.”); id.
(Scalia, J., concurring) (repeating essence of his argument in Walton); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639, 666–67 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (contending that the
individualization mandate undermines “consistency and rationality among sentencing
determinations” because it “permits sentencers to accord different treatment, for whatever mitigating
reasons they wish, not only to two different murderers but to two murderers whose crimes have been
found to be of similar gravity”); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (asserting need to balance competing goals of realizing nondiscriminatory results and
allowing for individualized consideration); Locket, 438 U.S. at 622 (White, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgments of the Court) (asserting that “[t]he Court has now
completed its about-face since Furman”); id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (contending that the Lockett rule “will not eliminate arbitrariness or freakishness in the
imposition of sentences, but will codify and institutionalize it”).
180. See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 486–88 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Walton, 497 U.S. at 673 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
181. See, e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 439–44 (1990) (rejecting requirement
that jury find mitigating circumstances unanimously); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989)
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from conservatives based on the purported conflict with the goal of
consistency.182
The conflict exists only in the Court’s rhetoric about the purposes of
the doctrine rather than in the doctrine itself. However, the rhetoric
hinders understanding and assessment of capital-sentencing doctrine. At
the doctrinal level, narrowing of the death-eligible group does not
conflict with individualized sentencing.183 States can narrow the deatheligible group, while also providing the individualized sentencing
required by Lockett.184 Yet, the rhetorical claims about the first mandate
impede the explanation of the second one. The Court has continued to
claim to enforce the narrowing rule and that the rationale is the pursuit of
equality. Until the Court stops making those claims, it cannot sensibly
articulate a rationale for the second mandate that rejects equality as an
Eighth Amendment end.

(concluding that Texas statute did not allow jury an adequate opportunity to reject death penalty
based on mitigating evidence of retardation and childhood abuse); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S.
393, 397–99 (1987) (rejecting requirement that mitigating factors appear on statutory list in order to
be considered in sentencing); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 67, 85 (1987) (rejecting mandatory
death penalty for intentional murder by an inmate already serving life sentence without possibility of
parole); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5–6, 8 (1986) (reversing death sentence where
sentencing judge had refused to consider evidence of defendant’s good behavior while in jail
awaiting trial); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112–13 (1982) (overturning death sentence
imposed based on statute interpreted by state courts to preclude consideration of defendant’s
emotional disturbance and violent and tumultuous childhood); (Harry) Roberts v. Louisiana, 431
U.S. 633, 637–38 (1977) (per curiam) (striking down mandatory death penalty for murder of police
officer). But see Graham, 506 U.S. at 463, 478 (rejecting, on nonretroactivity grounds, claim that
youth, family background and positive character traits could not be adequately considered under
Texas statute).
182. Justices seeking to limit or undermine the second mandate are not the only ones to cite
the conflict as a reason for reform. Justice Blackmun originally rejected the second mandate, see,
e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 363 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), then came to accept
it, see California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 562–63 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and then later
concluded that it fundamentally conflicted with the first mandate, see Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S.
1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari). However, he concluded that
the solution was to strike down all existing death penalty statutes, see id. at 1158–59, and he asserted
doubt that any statute could appropriately reconcile the purported conflict. See id. at 1145.
183. See, e.g., Walton, 497 U.S. at 716–18 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that there is
no tension at the doctrinal level, because the narrowing function for identifying statutory aggravators
functions at an eligibility phase while the individualized-consideration mandate functions at a
subsequent selection phase where the sentencer actually decides whether the offender should receive
the death penalty).
184. See CARTER, KREITZBERG & HOWE, supra note 118, at 170–71.
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2. Eliminating the first mandate to focus on the second
Repudiating the narrowing rule would clarify that the
individualization mandate is the core of capital-sentencing doctrine and
would eliminate a major obstacle to rationalizing and assessing that
mandate.185 If the narrowing rule disappears, the perceived need to
justify it on consistency grounds also disappears, which allows an
explanation for individualization that permits inconsistency. Thus, by
repudiating the narrowing rule, the Court would decisively end the
confusion over whether capital-sentencing regulation is at war with itself
and could proceed to address important questions about the purpose and
legitimacy of the second mandate.
The second mandate finds Eighth Amendment explanation in the
same theory that explains proportionality doctrine.186 The goal is to help
ensure that no one receives a death sentence who does not deserve it.
Even after the exclusion of those offenders who are protected from death
eligibility by proportionality doctrine, the deserts of those who have
committed capital crimes vary greatly. Laws concerning felony murder
and vicarious liability bring within the death-eligible group many capital
offenders whose involvement in the capital crime is low. The mental
states, mental capacities, and prior conduct of those who are highly
involved in a capital crime also can differ enormously. Whether or not all
capital offenders are unique, they vary widely in their deserts, and
legislatures arguably cannot adequately capture the important variances
with categorical sentencing rules. Both permitting the convicted capital
offender, at a separate sentencing hearing, to present any mitigating
evidence that he desires concerning his character, record, or crime, and
ensuring that the sentencer can use that evidence to reject the death
penalty could help to avoid undeserved death sentences.187

185. Some Justices have at times asserted that both mandates serve the pursuit of equality. See,
e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304–05 (1976) (plurality opinion) (asserting that the
failure to individualize capital sentencing would treat all capital offenders alike when differences
exist among them). However, the claim that individualized sentencing promotes consistency in the
use of the death penalty is implausible if only because individualized sentencing provides no
safeguard against arbitrary reprieves outside of the sentencing trial.
186. See Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the Individualization Mandate in Capital Sentencing:
Darrow’s Defense of Leopold & Loeb, 79 IOWA L. REV. 989, 1051–56 (1994).
187. The deserts limitation, much more than a consistency goal, also can explain why the
Court has focused its Eighth Amendment regulatory efforts on the capital-sentencing trial. A
consistency theory cannot plausibly explain why the Court would regulate the capital-sentencing
trial while leaving prosecutors with almost unfettered discretion to not pursue death sentences in
death-eligible cases. Mandating equality at the sentencing trial is senseless unless it is part of an
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Accepting the deserts limitation as the central Eighth Amendment
principle governing capital selection188 would not eliminate
disagreements over how the Court should regulate the capital-sentencing
trial. Indeed, Justices who concur on the centrality of the deserts
limitation could still differ over how to pursue it.189 Because the Court
lacks the ability to translate the command into specific rules about who
actually deserves death, some Justices could favor deregulation of the
capital-sentencing trial and reliance simply on the proportionality rules to
define a death-eligible group.190 Justices who are skeptical of the Court’s
ability to protect against improper influences (such as racial bias) on
capital sentencers could favor abolition or near abolition.191 Justices who
reject both deregulation and abolition could conclude that proportionality
doctrine and the individualized-sentencing rule most effectively fulfill
the deserts limitation, which means that they would not vote to expand
regulation of the sentencing trial but could support further expansion of
proportionality protections.192 Finally, some Justices could favor

effort to achieve equality in the greater selection process, which could only be pursued, even in
theory, by trying to regulate prosecutorial decisions on charging and plea-bargaining in capital cases.
In contrast, the deserts limitation does not assert that everyone who deserves a death penalty must
receive it, but only that those who do not deserve the sanction should not receive it. Regulating the
sentencing trial might help to protect against undeserved death sentences even if prosecutors are
allowed to act arbitrarily in deciding which death-eligible offenders to pursue.
188. The deserts limitation rests on the notion that the Eighth Amendment proscribes
disproportional punishments in addition to punishments deemed inherently inhumane. Some Justices
have concluded, on originalist grounds, that the prohibition is only against certain inhumane forms
of punishment. See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 488 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[T]he better view is that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was intended to place only
substantive limitations on punishments . . . .”); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991)
(Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (“[T]he Clause disables the Legislature from authorizing
particular forms or ‘modes’ of punishment . . . .”). However, the “modes only” position is vigorously
disputed on historical grounds, and since Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910), a
majority of the Court has consistently rejected it. See Howe, supra note 173, at 461–62. See also
Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY. BILL RTS. J. 475, 507–19
(2005) (contending that an originalist inquiry demonstrates “that the ban was meant to outlaw
punishments that, while permissible in some circumstances, are disproportionate for the offense and
the offender at hand”).
189. See Howe, supra note 173, at 464–80.
190. See Howe, supra note 10, at 835–43 (explaining the argument for deregulation of the
capital-sentencing trial and reliance on proportionality rules regarding death-eligibility); see also
Howe, supra note 186, at 1056–68 (describing the grounds for unease over the Court’s imposition of
the individualization mandate).
191. See Howe, supra note 13, at 2085–89 (explaining the Eighth Amendment argument for
abolition based on disproportionality stemming from unconscious racial discrimination).
192. See Howe, supra note 173, at 474–76 (explaining current doctrine as a compromise
between arguments for deregulation and abolition).
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additional regulation of sentencing trials to try to ensure that capital
sentencers impose the death penalty only on those who deserve it.193
Repudiation of the narrowing rule would not end debate about capitalsentencing regulation. However, repudiation would help focus the debate
on how to implement the core restriction that the Constitution imposes
on the distribution of capital sentences.
B. Honesty About Inequality
Repudiation of the narrowing rule would also help the Court
acknowledge that capital selection is arbitrary and undesirably
discriminatory. The many claims by Justices that the narrowing rule has
assured reasonable consistency in the use of the death penalty have
conveyed that a majority of the Court does not perceive substantial
inequality in capital selection.194 If the Court were to concede that the
Eighth Amendment does not require equality, the Justices would not
need to obscure the truth.
1. The racial discrimination problem and the inability of the Court to
plausibly discount it under a consistency view of the Eighth Amendment
The problem of racial discrimination, whether intentional or
unconscious, has continued to plague capital selection in the modern

193. See, e.g., Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in Capital
Cases, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2590, 2599 (1996) (asserting that states should “instruct sentencers that the
death penalty . . . is reserved only for those defendants who deserve the penalty and that the moral
judgment of whether death is deserved remains entirely with them; that the determination whether
death is deserved involves consideration of any factor that suggests whether the defendant is or is not
among the small group of ‘worst’ offenders; and that, in deciding whether the defendant deserves the
death penalty, the sentencer is required to consider not only the circumstances surrounding the crime
but also aspects of the defendant’s character, background, and capabilities that bear on his
culpability for the crime”); Howe, supra note 173, at 478 (contending that prosecutors should not be
allowed to “present capital sentencers with utilitarian evidence or arguments to justify death
sentences”).
194. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 338–39 (1997) (asserting
that the McCleskey majority “did not want to concede facts” indicating the powerful influence of
race in Georgia’s post-Furman-death-penalty system and that “[d]oing so would have performed the
tremendous benefit of educating the public about the real world of capital sentencing and the real
world of Supreme Court decisionmaking”); Robert A. Burt, Wrong Tomorrow, Wrong Yesterday, but
Not Today: On Sliding into Evil with Zeal but Without Understanding, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 19, 34–35 (1999) (citing McCleskey as the first example for the proposition that “Dred Scott, of
course, is by general agreement today ranked as the low point, the most deeply immoral ruling, in
our constitutional jurisprudence (though I must say that the decision has earned this rank only after a
close race in a crowded field)”); Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1389 (asserting that the decision in
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) “repressed the truth”).
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era.195 The problem surely is not as severe as in the pre-Furman past.196
American society generally has progressed since the 1960s in reducing
racial prejudice for many reasons that go beyond the Court’s doctrine.197
Likewise, the Court has developed laws, other than the narrowing rule,
that marginally limit racial bias in the capital selection process, even if
obliquely. One example, as we have seen, is the proportionality doctrine,
particularly the elimination of rape as a death-eligible crime.198 The
Court also has taken steps to ensure greater participation on juries by
members of racial minority groups199 and to allow the ferreting out of
racial bias during jury selection in capital cases.200 Nonetheless, there
can be no doubt, as Justice O’Connor asserted not long ago, that, in the
United States, “race unfortunately still matters.”201 In the post-Furman
era, empirical evidence concerning capital selection bears out this
conclusion. There are many studies from a variety of jurisdictions
demonstrating that the race of the victim and, to a lesser extent, the race
of the defendant, often continue to influence decisions determining
which capital offenders receive the death penalty.202
The most sophisticated investigation of race and capital selection, the
famous Baldus study,203 gave rise to what is surely the Court’s most
controversial decision on capital selection after Furman. Based on a
painstaking study of Georgia murder cases from the mid- to late 1970s,
the Baldus researchers concluded that a defendant faced odds 4.3 times

195. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 132–34 (1999); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Courtroom Contortions: How
America’s Application of the Death Penalty Erodes the Principle of Equal Justice Under Law, THE
AM. PROSPECT, July 2004, at A19–21 (“The Court’s reason for [the result in McCleskey v. Kemp]
came close to a frank admission that the administration of capital punishment would grind to a halt if
courts took seriously the challenge of ensuring that death sentences are not the products of racial
bias.”).
196. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 5, at 289 (noting the importance of the civil rights
movement of the 1960s in increasing greater representation of blacks on juries).
197. See, e.g., BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE
AMERICAN DREAM 236 (2006) (“I maintain, however, that in today’s America [racial] prejudices are
far more loosely held than they once were—and hence are subject to refutation.”).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 155–156.
199. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (restricting the ability of
prosecutors to use peremptory strikes to eliminate potential jurors).
200. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 28–33 (1986) (ruling that a capital defendant charged
with an interracial crime can advise prospective jurors of the race of the victim and inquire about
their possible racial bias).
201. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
202. See Howe, supra note 13, at 2106–23.
203. See BALDUS STUDY, supra note 110.
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higher of receiving the death penalty solely because his victim was white
rather than black.204 Regarding race-of-defendant discrimination, the
researchers found that black defendants enjoyed an advantage over white
defendants in the overall run of cases.205 Black murderers, as a group,
were beneficiaries because their crimes were usually intra-racial.206
Nonetheless, among the white-victim cases, the researchers concluded
that a defendant faced odds 2.4 times higher of receiving the death
penalty simply because he was black rather than white.207 Thus, solely
because of racial factors, a black offender who killed a white person
faced odds many times higher of receiving the death penalty than a white
offender who killed a black person. This evidence formed the basis for
challenges under the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment
brought by Warren McCleskey, a black man who had been sentenced to
death in Georgia during the relevant period for killing a white police
officer. Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected those challenges by a
five-to-four vote in McCleskey v. Kemp.208
While critics reviled the McCleskey decision on multiple grounds,209
the most objectionable part of the majority opinion concerned the
rejection of the Eighth Amendment challenge. The Court purported to
assume that the Baldus study was valid because the Court of Appeals had
assumed its validity.210 Despite that assumption, the Supreme Court at
least offered an intelligible basis to reject McCleskey’s Equal Protection
claim. The majority asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment required
proof “that the decision-makers in his case acted with discriminatory
purpose,” and that the statistical study failed to establish that any of the

204. See id. at 316.
205. See id. at 327.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 328.
208. 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987). The majority Justices were Powell, Rehnquist, White,
O’Connor, and Scalia. See id. at 282. The dissenters were Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens. See id. at 345 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
209. See, e.g., The Supreme Court—Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 158 (1987)
(describing the decision as “logically unsound, morally reprehensible, and legally unsupportable”).
210. While the Federal District court had found the Baldus study flawed, the Court of Appeals
had assumed that the study was valid and had, nonetheless, rejected the constitutional claims. See
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.7 (1987). There was support in the amicus filings in the
Supreme Court for the methodological soundness of the study. A group of eminent social scientists
endorsed its validity. See Brief for Dr. Franlin M. Fisher, Dr. Richard O. Lempert, Dr. Peter W.
Sperlich, Dr. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Professor Hans Zeisel & Professor Franklin E. Zimring as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner Warren McCleskey at 3, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)
(No. 84-6811).
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relevant decision-makers in McCleskey’s case acted with such a
purpose.211 While one might disagree with that interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court’s precedents supported it,212 and it
provided a clear explanation of why McCleskey’s evidence, even if
accepted, was insufficient. As for the Eighth Amendment claim,
however, the Court obfuscated. If the Baldus study was valid, it showed
dramatic inconsistency in the distribution of death sentences based on
race—particularly the race of the victim—and the Court had never
suggested that “invidious intent” mattered under the Eighth
Amendment.213 Confronted with this claim, the Court equivocated both
about the meaning of the study and about whether the Eighth
Amendment required reasonable consistency.214 At some points, the
Court implied that the Eighth Amendment required consistency,215 but
the Baldus study did not show that the Georgia system failed to achieve
it.216 At other times, the Court implied that, while there might be
inconsistency in Georgia’s selection process, such inequality was not
constitutionally relevant, although the Court did not illuminate a
principled Eighth Amendment reason.217 The Court recounted its

211. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292.
212. See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1403 (“Had the court ruled differently in McCleskey it
would not have been in step with judicial tradition; to the contrary, it would have been making an
unprecedented step forward.”).
213. COLE, supra note 195, at 136.
214. See, e.g., id. at 140 (describing why the “reader of McCleskey comes away with
conflicting messages”).
215. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 303 (reiterating the plurality’s claim in Gregg that the
post-Furman Georgia system safeguarded “against arbitrariness and caprice”); id. at 306–07
(“[A]bsent a showing that the Georgia capital punishment system operates in an arbitrary and
capricious manner, McCleskey cannot prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating that other
defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the death penalty.”); id. at 313 n.37 (“The
Gregg-type statute imposes unprecedented safeguards in the special context of capital punishment
[to promote rationality].”).
216. See, e.g., id. at 291 n.7 (“Our assumption that the Baldus study is statistically valid does
not include the assumption that the study shows that racial considerations actually enter into any
sentencing decisions in Georgia.”); id. at 312 (“At most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy
that appears to correlate with race.”); id. at 313 (“[W]e decline to assume that what is unexplained is
invidious.”); id. at 308 (“Statistics at most may show only a likelihood that a particular factor entered
into some decisions.”).
217. See, e.g., id. at 307 n.28 (asserting that “[t]he Constitution is not offended by
inconsistency” that results from various discretionary decisions that occur throughout the selection
process); id. at 311 (“But the inherent lack of predictability of jury decisions does not justify their
condemnation.”); id. at 317 (“If arbitrary and capricious punishment is the touchstone under the
Eighth Amendment, such a claim could—at least in theory—be used upon any arbitrary
variable . . . .”); id. at 319 (“The Constitution does not require that a State eliminate any
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doctrine on capital selection and concluded that, since Georgia had
complied with it, “we lawfully may presume” that McCleskey’s death
sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment.218 However, the opinion
both discounted the reality of racial inequality revealed by the Baldus
study and failed to clarify the purpose of the Eighth Amendment in
regulating capital selection.
Despite abundant empirical evidence that race—usually the race of
the victim—continues to influence outcomes in capital selection, Court
majorities since McCleskey have also often spoken as if these studies are
invalid.219 In 1990, after an evaluative synthesis of all fifty-three thenexisting post-Furman studies, the General Accounting Office concluded
that the race of the victim frequently influenced the selection process. 220
Subsequent studies, while not unanimous, confirm this general
conclusion.221 The empirical evidence is readily available, and the
Justices seem likely to have noted it. Nonetheless, as we have seen,
Court majorities after McCleskey have not simply remained silent about
the inequality but have often effectively denied it,222 declaring that the
narrowing rule serves to “ensure consistency in determining who
receives a death sentence.” 223
As long as the Court clings to the rhetoric of consistency to explain
the narrowing rule, it cannot speak candidly about unconscious
discrimination and caprice in capital selection. Surely, the disconnection

demonstrable disparity that correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a
criminal justice system that includes capital punishment.”).
218. Id. at 308.
219. After McCleskey, these studies generally are useless to establish a constitutional
violation. The exception concerns studies that tend to confirm racialized decisionmaking by a
particular prosecutor’s office across many cases. Such studies could sometimes help show the kind
of discrimination required to establish an equal protection violation. See John H. Blume, Theodore
Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1805–06 (1998).
220. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING:
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5–6 (1990) [hereinafter GAO STUDY].
221. See Howe, supra note 13, at 2117–19 (discussing several subsequent studies); see also
Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 807 (2009)
(recent study of race and capital selection in Harris County, Texas, which encompasses Houston);
Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on Death
Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990-1999, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 23–28, tbls.6, 7 & 8
(2006) (recent study of race and geographical disparities in capital selection in California). Cf.
DONOHUE, supra note 120, at 2–3 (finding arbitrariness in the use of the death penalty in
Connecticut from 1973 to 2007).
222. See supra Part V.
223. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 436 (2008).
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between rhetoric and reality stems from the Court’s effort to uphold
capital punishment without contradicting its past efforts to find
congruence with Furman; the Justices likely understand the reality of
unconscious discrimination and caprice. Years after McCleskey, in the
papers of the late Justice Marshall, an internal Court memo from Justice
Scalia surfaced,224 revealing that he had advised the other Justices, as the
Court considered McCleskey, that he had no doubt that capital selection
continued to be influenced by “irrational sympathies and antipathies,
including racial” ones, and that these influences were ineradicable.225
Although Justice Scalia did not write the opinion in McCleskey, he joined
it, and his memo underscores that even those in the majority probably
understood that the Court’s narrowing rule had done little to promote
equality. Of course, given the public outcry and the frenzy of new deathpenalty legislation after Furman, many Justices may strongly resist any
concession that would again seem to call for widespread invalidation of
death-penalty systems. Yet, the Court obscures a serious social problem
when it claims that the distinction between pre- and post-Furman deathpenalty systems is “reasonable consistency.” Even if the Court will not
strike down death-penalty systems that produce unequal outcomes, it
does not serve us well by masking reality.

224. See, e.g., Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies
from the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia’s McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER. L. REV.
1035, 1037–38 (1994) (discussing the public revelation of the memo when the Library of Congress
made public the papers of Justice Marshall).
225. Henry J. Reske, Behind the Scenes, 79 A.B.A. J., August 1993, at 28 (quoting
Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Antonin Scalia, in No. 84-6811 – McCleskey v. Kemp
of Jan. 6, 1987, McCleskey v. Kemp File, THURGOOD MARSHALL PAPERS, The Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.) The context of the statement in the memo was as follows:
Scalia expressed his general support for Justice Lewis Powell’s initial attempts to draft a
majority opinion. But more significantly, it was also a medium for Scalia’s “two
reservations . . . .” “I disagree,” he began, “with the argument that the inferences that can
be drawn from the Baldus study are weakened by the fact that each jury and each trial is
unique, or by the large number of variables at issue. And I do not share the view, implicit
in [Powell’s draft opinion], that an effect of racial factors upon sentencing, if it could be
shown by sufficiently strong statistical evidence, would require reversal. Since it is my
view,” Scalia continued, “that the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and
antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial [ones] is real,
acknowledged by the [cases] of this court and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I
need is more proof.”
See Dorin, supra note 224, at 1037–38 (alterations in original).
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2. Addressing the racial discrimination problem more forthrightly under
a deserts-limitation view of the Eighth Amendment.
The Court need not obscure the existence of discrimination and
caprice if it acknowledges that the deserts limitation fully explains its
Eighth Amendment regulation of capital selection.226 This limitation is
not offended if many capital offenders who deserve the death penalty
escape that sanction. The deserts limitation commands only that no one
receive the death sanction who does not deserve it. Thus, by renouncing
the narrowing requirement and focusing on the second mandate, the
Court could not only provide a unified theory of Eighth Amendment
regulation but could also speak candidly about the problem of “irrational
sympathies and antipathies, including racial” ones,227 left unsolved.
Because the deserts limitation does not aim to prevent inconsistency,
statistical studies finding the influence of irrational factors on capital
selection in a city, county, or state generally do not establish a
constitutional violation. First, the studies often do not separately examine
the capital-sentencing trial or, if so, they do not identify racialized
decisionmaking at that stage.228 Often, studies look only at the overall
death-selection process or only at the decisions of prosecutors.229
Likewise, among the few statistical studies that have attempted to isolate
racialized decisionmaking at the sentencing phase, some have found no
evidence that capital sentencers favored white defendants or killers of
black victims.230 Studies that fail to identify racial effects at the
sentencing stage do little to prove that death sentences that have been
issued in a jurisdiction are undeserved. If a sentencing jury has correctly
determined that a guilty and convicted capital murderer deserves the
death sanction, his deserts do not change because unconscious racial bias
motivated the prosecutor to seek that sanction. The motivations of the
226. Although too ill-developed and distracting to warrant perpetuation, even the narrowing
requirement is better explained by the deserts limitation than by a consistency mandate. See Howe,
supra note 10, at 833.
227. See Reske, supra note 225 (quoting Memorandum to the Conference from Justice
Antonin Scalia, in No. 84-6811 – McCleskey v. Kemp of Jan. 6, 1987, McCleskey v. Kemp File,
THURGOOD MARSHALL PAPERS, The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).
228. See Scott W. Howe, 2010 Death Penalty Issue: Race, Death and Disproportionality, 37
N. KY. L. REV. 213, 226 & n.86 (2010).
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 221, at 830–39 (finding no evidence that capital-sentencing
juries in Harris County (Houston), Texas, between 1992 and 1999, acted out of bias against black
defendants or against killers of white victims, despite finding strong evidence that, due to racialized
decisionmaking by prosecutors, those defendants were disfavored in the overall selection process).
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prosecutor alone would not undermine the reliability of the jury’s deserts
determination.231
Under a deserts limitation, even statistical studies that separately
examine the capital-sentencing trial and find racial effects at that stage
carry muted probative value. The problem is that the studies cannot
distinguish between two kinds of unconscious discrimination—one
prohibited by the deserts limitation and one permitted. Because the
deserts limitation is unidirectional, it is forgiving of unconscious racial
bias in favor of mercy, although it is not indifferent to racial bias that
influences a desert finding in support of a death sentence. Statistical
studies indicating racialized decisionmaking at the capital-sentencing
stage cannot reveal the degree to which the racial effects reflect one kind
of discrimination versus the other. The ultimate question for the
interpreter of these studies remains whether sentencers seem to be
condemning some capital offenders who do not deserve it or merely
reprieving some others who do deserve it.
In McCleskey, the evidence from the Baldus study, if accepted as
valid, unquestionably demonstrated an Eighth Amendment violation
under a “reasonable consistency” command, but it was much less
compelling under a deserts limitation. “Much of the disparity seemed
attributable to Georgia prosecutors, who sought the death penalty in 70
percent of cases involving black defendants and white victims, but only
19 percent of cases involving white defendants and black victims.”232
Yet, evidence of prosecutorial bias was not evidence that Georgia juries
sentenced defendants to death who did not deserve it. The Baldus study
also revealed statistical evidence of racialized decisionmaking at Georgia
sentencing trials.233 Yet, there was no clarity that the statistical evidence
of bias by juries reflected undeserved death sentences rather than
undeserved reprieves. Some commentators would be predisposed to

231. A plausible argument can be made that even a statistical study that indicates racialized
decisionmaking by prosecutors, but not by sentencing juries, could justify a disproportionality
conclusion under the Eighth Amendment. The argument would assert that, at some point, the
expressive function of capital punishment should carry paramount importance and that the
expressive function is distorted when large racial disparities arise. See Lee, supra note 135, at 712–
13. Under this view, the proportionality notion would carry a limited comparative element, although
the point at which a finding of disproportionality should arise would remain elusive. I note, however,
that this argument lacks a solid foundation in the existing capital-sentencing rulings of the Supreme
Court.
232. COLE, supra note 195, at 133, (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 327 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
233. See BALDUS STUDY, supra note 110, at 187 tbl.44.
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conclude that the bias was not about mercy.234 Yet, “[m]any observers
have contended” that the central problem was not undue harshness
toward any group but a “devaluation of black victims” and, thus, a
“relative leniency extended to killers of blacks.”235 The facts
surrounding Warren McCleskey’s offense certainly did not suggest that
his was a marginal case for the death penalty. Evidence indicated that he
had participated in an armed robbery of a furniture store during which he
personally and intentionally had killed a police officer who had
responded to a silent alarm.236 Evidence also revealed that McCleskey
had participated in two additional armed robberies in the weeks
preceding the capital offense.237 At McCleskey’s trial, Georgia also had
allowed him to present any mitigating evidence as defined by Lockett
and allowed the jury freedom to reject the death penalty. If the function
of the Eighth Amendment was to ensure that McCleskey would not
receive the death penalty unless he deserved it, the Court plausibly could
disbelieve that the Baldus study demonstrated that his jury had acted
unfairly.
Had the McCleskey Court chosen to highlight the evidence of
inconsistency but relied on the deserts limitation to explain why that
evidence did not establish an Eighth Amendment violation, the Court
still would have displeased many, but at least it would have spoken
forthrightly. That approach would have been better than the course the
majority followed. The actual McCleskey opinion sought to discount the
Baldus study as if it had uncovered only a minor anomaly.238 The
majority asserted at one point, for example, that “[a]t most, the Baldus
study indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race.”239 In
the same vein, the Court sought to maintain the fiction that the Eighth
Amendment required consistency in the distribution of death sentences
and that the doctrine assured it. The Court claimed, for example, that the

234. One can sensibly conclude that a likelihood that desert determinations that underlie even
a fraction of death verdicts are distorted by racial prejudice and other improper factors justifies
striking down a death-penalty system for violating the deserts limitation. See supra text
accompanying note 190. Nonetheless, much room for disagreement remains over the level of
imperfection that should be allowed of any system and further, over whether statistical studies can
ever sufficiently establish that a system is producing any or too many undeserved death sentences.
See supra text accompanying notes 230–31.
235. Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1391, 1393.
236. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 283.
237. See McCleskey v. State, 263 S.E.2d. 146, 150 (Ga. 1980).
238. KENNEDY, supra note 194, at 338.
239. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312.
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Georgia system safeguarded “against arbitrariness and caprice.”240
Nonetheless, in the end, the Court also noted the option of a legislative
response to the problem. The majority asserted that “McCleskey’s
arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies.”241 Yet, the Court
could not effectively emphasize a need for democratic reform while
simultaneously denying the need for it.242 Reliance on the deserts
limitation alone would have allowed the Court to highlight rather than
discount what the Baldus study established and to explain intelligibly
why the study did not establish an Eighth Amendment violation.243
The McCleskey Court also could have revised the explanation of
congruence between Furman and modern doctrine, and that explanation
is easy.244 The two defendants in the companion cases to Furman, Elmer
Branch and Lucious Jackson, had received the death penalty for rape.245
According to the Coker decision, which came only five years after
Furman and invalidated the death penalty for rape, those death sentences

240. Id. at 303.
241. Id. at 319.
242. Cf. KENNEDY, supra note 194, at 338–39 (“It would have been better if the Court openly
declared that, for reasons of policy, it declined to grant relief to McCleskey notwithstanding the
disturbing facts revealed by the Baldus study.”).
243. After McCleskey, Congress considered allowing statistical proof to establish a
presumption of racial discrimination in capital sentencing, but the bill failed. See Racial Justice Act
of 1989, S. 1696, 101st Cong. § 2922(b)(1) (1989). The state legislative response has been only
marginally more fruitful. Only Kentucky and North Carolina have signed legislation to permit
capital defendants to bring challenges of racial discrimination based on statistical evidence. See KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300 (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A–2011 to –2012 (2011). The
difficulty for defendants under the Kentucky statute, moreover, is that it requires them to raise the
claim before trial and state specifically how the evidence shows that “racial considerations played a
significant part in the decision to seek a death sentence in his or her case.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
532.300(4) (West 2011). Defendants apparently may only challenge charging decisions and only
based on evidence of discrimination in the specific prosecutorial district. See Seth Kotch & Robert P.
Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North
Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2116 & n.380 (2010). Likewise, the statute requires defendants to
prove their claims “by clear and convincing evidence.” See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300(5)
(West 2011). The North Carolina Act, adopted in 2009, is more favorable toward capital defendants.
It allows statistical evidence that does not focus on the particular prosecutorial district, covers not
only charging decisions, but also prosecutorial peremptory challenges and decisions by juries, and
imposes on the defense only the preponderance standard of proof. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A–
2011 to –2012 (2011); Kotch & Mosteller, supra, at 2116–18 & nn.380–81.
244. Although in terms too brief to be enlightening and in context of a paragraph that muddled
together the concepts of excessiveness and inconsistency, the McCleskey Court at one point alluded
to “presumed excessive[ness]” as the explanation for congruence between Furman and modern
doctrine. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 301.
245. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).
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were disproportional.246 As for William Furman, while his death
sentence was for murder, he received no chance to present all mitigating
evidence concerning his character, record, and crime at a separate
sentencing hearing.247 His trial violated the individualization rule, which
was announced in the 1976 cases only four years after Furman and
reiterated in Lockett two years later. Thus, Furman is best understood not
as a mandate for consistency but as a mandate against retributive excess.
V. CONCLUSION
The notion that the Eighth Amendment demands consistency in the
use of the death penalty dies hard. Rhetoric in some of the crucial
Furman opinions seemed to call for consistency, and the Court has long
assured us that the narrowing rule in post-Furman capital-sentencing law
provides a principled basis for distinguishing the few cases “in which the
death penalty [is] imposed, from the many cases in which it [is] not.”248
The Court also appeared to come close to effective abolition of the death
penalty in McCleskey, in which four Justices were prepared to strike
down Georgia’s post-Furman death-penalty system because of statistical
evidence of racially inconsistent outcomes.249 After McCleskey, the
Court also has maintained the rhetoric that the narrowing requirement in
capital sentencing exists to “ensure that the death penalty will be
imposed in a consistent, rational manner.”250 Given all that the Court has
said and what it almost did in McCleskey, the idea that Furman mandates
equality is not easily dispelled.
The hard truth, however, is that the Eighth Amendment, as revealed
in modern capital-sentencing law, is about one overriding command: the
government can only impose a death sentence on a person who deserves
that sanction.251 The idea that consistency is required represents what the

246. See supra text accompanying notes 136–141.
247. See Steiker, supra note 31, at 95.
248. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (plurality opinion); Maynard v.
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363 (1988) (quoting Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433).
249. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 345 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Stevens,
and in all but Part IV–B, Brennan, JJ.).
250. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 776 (1990). See also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,
436 (2008) (asserting that the narrowing rule serves to “ensure consistency in determining who
receives a death sentence.”).
251. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 10, at 828–35; see also Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the
Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1203 (2000) (“The Court’s real concern is not equality in
punishment, but proportionality in punishment.”); McCord, supra note 17, at 548 (“[T]he Court has
had only one primary goal for its regulation of capital punishment: decreasing overinclusion, with
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Court has said, and what many believe the Court should enforce through
abolition, but not what the Court has done. All of the Court’s Eighth
Amendment doctrine regulating capital sentencing is best explained as an
effort to prevent undeserved death sentences, and this idea of
proportionality does not merge with a requirement of consistency.
The goal of maintaining both robust death-penalty systems and
consistency in the use of the sanction was always implausible. Modern
systems retain enormous opportunities for discretionary reprieves.252
Moreover, in an endeavor as subjective, emotion-laden, and dependent
on humans253 as determining the deserved punishment for murderers,
elimination of arbitrary influences, including “irrational sympathies and
antipathies,” is impossible.254 The idea that a narrowing rule—other than
one so demanding as to produce effective abolition—could assure
equality was fantasy. Yet, when the Court approved the resumption of
capital sentencing in the 1976 cases and asserted that the minimal and
haphazard narrowing effects in the new statutes could produce
consistency, observers, and even many of the Justices, seemed
persuaded.
The Court should repudiate the narrowing mandate. The requirement
carries little, if any, meaning, but the continued claim that it produces
consistency has impeded recognition that individualized consideration is
the central Eighth Amendment mandate that bears on capital sentencing.
The individualization rule finds explanation in the same rationale that
justified the Court in directly limiting death eligibility through its
proportionality decisions: the deserts limitation. Four decades after
Furman, if the Court remains unwilling to strike down death-penalty

particular interest in minimizing invidious overinclusion due to racial bias.”); Wilkins, supra note
135, at 457 (“[W]hen surveying the terrain of all of the Court’s capital Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, one can best impose some kind of order upon the material by viewing it through the
lens of a deserts-limitation principle.”). Cf. Janet C. Hoeffel, Risking the Eighth Amendment:
Arbitrariness, Juries, and Discretion in Capital Cases, 46 B.C. L. REV. 771, 787 (2005) (asserting
that the concurring Justices in Furman were more concerned about “arbitrariness in an individual
case” than with “arbitrariness between cases” and thus, “consistency was not, and has not been, the
Court’s end goal.”).
252. See supra text accompanying note 120.
253. Among many other factors, widely varying competence levels among capital defense
lawyers contribute greatly to arbitrariness in capital selection. See David R. Dow, Bell v. Cone: The
Fatal Consequences of Incomplete Failure, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES 389, 414 (John H. Blume &
Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009); Louis D. Bilionis & Richard A. Rosen, Lawyers, Arbitrariness, and
the Eighth Amendment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1301–02 (1997).
254. See BANNER, supra note 5, at 288, 290 (explaining why “the major determinants” of who
lives and who dies are “not the statutory aggravating . . . circumstances.”).
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systems that produce unequal outcomes, honesty calls for acknowledging
the inequality and clarifying that the Eighth Amendment prohibits not
inconsistency but retributive excess.
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